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DOUBTING THE RESURRECTION:
A REPLY TO JAMES A. KELLER
Stephen T. Davis
In this paper, I reply to James A. Keller's criticisms of my "Is It Possible To Know That
Jesus Was Raised From the Dead?" I first discuss three of Keller's arguments about the
New Testament evidence for the resurrection of Jesus. I then respond to two philosophical
criticisms Keller makes of my original article. Finally, I argue that Keller has paid insufficient attention to several powerful arguments that support the thesis that Jesus was
genuinely raised from the dead.

This paper is a reply to James A. Keller's article, "Contemporary Christian Doubts
About the Resurrection."l His article is a response to my paper, "Is It Possible To
Know That Jesus Was Raised From the Dead?"2 Keller's is the second response to
my paper that has appeared in this journal. 3 I am happy to admit that I have benefitted from both. The first was written from a theological perspective that might be
described as to the right of mine; Keller's position might be described as to the left
of mine. I find myself wishing that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean had some
relevance to theological disputes.
The thesis of my original paper was that Christians who are supernaturalists and
who believe in a theologically traditional understanding of the resurrection of Jesus
are or can be rational in doing so. Keller is right that I do not there define clearly
what I mean by the term "resurrection," but his own estimate of my meaning ("an
event which happened to Jesus (and not just to his followers) in which Jesus,
though he had truly died, was restored to life and consciousness and after which his
living body left the tomb"-p. 40) is quite acceptable to me. 4
Keller thinks that I have not established my thesis. He argues that "we cannot today reconstruct what the resurrection involved because there is no clear, historically
reliable account of what the resurrection was thought to be by those who directly
experienced the Easter event" (p. 41). He further argues that my thesis only holds
if we observe an established pattern of miraculous divine acts in the world; the
problem, he says, is that "we do not have sufficient evidence to make it rational to
believe that the resurrection is part of a pattern of nonnatural events in which God
has acted for similar ends" (p. 41).
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There is much in Keller's paper with which I agree. (1) Any discussion of
the rationality of belief in the resurrection of Jesus must take into account issues
discussed professionally by New Testament scholars, and I did not do that in
any detail in the paper Keller criticizes. (I hope to have done so elsewhere.) (2)
Keller is at great pains to argue that his criticisms of me do not presuppose
naturalism (he repeats this point so frequently that it almost becomes a sort of
philosophical leitmotif); and I am prepared to agree that they do not. 5 (3) Keller
correctly argues, contrary to a brief and (as I now think) poorly considered
paragraph in my original paper, that my overall argument requires the notion
that the resurrection of Jesus cannot be explained naturalistically. I still think
Christians could accommodate the understanding of miracles suggested in that
paragraph, but Keller is right in pointing out that it would necessitate radical
changes in my own way of conceptualizing the resurrection. (4) I agree with
Keller (and the biblical scholars he cites) about the view of miracles held by
people in biblical times (pp. 52, 59-60, fn. 28). Such events were understood
not as violations of laws of nature but roughly as revelatory and awe-inspiring
acts of God. I did claim in my original paper that first century folk tended to
explain events naturalistically, just as we do today, and I stand by that claim. I
did not assume that their concept of miracle was roughly the same as that of
twentieth century philosophers. My aim was to deny a point often made by
critics of the biblical miracles,6 viz., that people in those days were much more
gullible than we are toward miracle claims, that they were prepared to believe
in miracles almost at the drop of a hat. If that is true, I still wonder why the
apostle Thomas, and many other first century doubters and critics of the resurrection, were so reluctant to believe. More importantly, if resurrections and other
miracles were held to be so common (but see John 9:32), why was this one
taken to be so significant?
However, I do not believe that Keller has successfully refuted the thesis of
my article, and I so argue in the present paper. It consists of three main sections.
In the first, I discuss three of Keller's arguments about the New Testament
evidence for the resurrection. In the second, I respond to two philosophical
criticisms that Keller makes of my paper-the first concerns hard and soft miracles
and the second concerns a pattern of divine activity. Finally, in the third section,
I briefly mention some historical-critical arguments that seem to me decisively
to support the thesis that belief in the resurrection of Jesus (in the sense defined
above) is rational.
II

There is no doubt that the most profound differences between Keller and me
on the resurrection of Jesus consist in our different attitudes toward and conclu-
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sions about the New Testament evidence. The crucial question between us is:
How reliable are the biblical texts that testify to the resurrection of Jesus? Keller's
position is cautious and even doubting. As a theological conservative, I simply
do not share his basic skepticism about the New Testament, about what we can
and cannot know or rationally believe about the events following the crucifixion
of Jesus.
Keller asks two main questions: First, are the New Testament accounts of the
resurrection of Jesus primitive, i.e., do they reflect the views of the eyewitnesses
to the resurrection events at the time they first came to believe? Second, are
those accounts true? Keller thinks we simply have no basis for any firm answer
to these questions. This, combined with his endorsement of my own view that
we ought to have a bias against supernatural events that can only be overcome
by very strong evidence indeed, leads Keller to doubt that the resurrection (as
I understand it) occurred.
Let me illustrate what I call Keller's basic skepticism. On the views of the
eyewitnesses, he says: "we do not have a historically reliable account of what
the very earliest believers in the resurrection understood it to involve" (p. 50).
This is because the accounts in the Gospels are all second-hand, sketchy, and
late (p. 46). "It is at least not clear," he says, "that the Gospel writers give
historically reliable accounts of what happened" (p. 48). What Keller thinks we
can learn from the empty tomb stories is startlingly meager; virtually all he will
allow is that the stories "probably show something about the understanding of
the resurrection held by those who told the stories" (p. 48). On the historical
trustworthiness of the early chapters of Acts, he cites with approval those New
Testament scholars who doubt their reliability (pp. 49-50). And on the New
Testament evidence for the resurrection as a whole, he says: 'Thus, all that the
historian of today can reliably conclude is that certain first-century Christians
said that Jesus appeared to certain people" (p. 49).
Now merely citing Keller's views and calling them skeptical do not refute
them. I only wish to make it clear that I do not share those views, nor do I think
the evidence justifies them. 7 It is obvious that the differences between Keller
and me on the resurrection accounts in the Bible are too huge to be adjudicated
here. Let me then be content with replying to three of his specific arguments.
(1) Keller argues that what we need to find is the understanding of the resurrection events held by those who witnessed them at the time they witnessed
them-not the opinions of later converts or even of those same people much
later. And to a certain extent, one can appreciate this point. Further, Keller is
surely right that in general we do not have eyewitness accounts of the resurrection
appearances of Jesus (I Corinthians 15:8 is an exception), and that the Gospels
were written years after the events they describe. But it does not follow from
this that the resurrection accounts are unreliable. Sometime we only realize the
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full meaning of an event long after we see it. As a teenager I once saw a world
record set at a track meet; it made little impression on me at the time-only
much later did I realize its significance. Thus it is perfectly possible that the
eyewitnesses did not understand the full significance of Jesus' resurrection at
the time, and that their mature and reliable grasp of what happened and what it
meant is found in the New Testament.
Furthermore, Keller has neglected to mention this fact: virtually all New
Testament scholars feel sure that there is primitive material in the Gospels (most
would argue that there is primitive material in the resurrection accounts at the
end of the Gospels); so the mere fact that the Gospels were written years later
does not by itself render them unreliable. 8 Though it is clear that the gospel
traditions grew and changed as time passed, it can be plausibly argued that at
least most of the gospels reached their final, canonical form during a time when
eyewitnesses to the events they record were still alive. Ancient traditions, some
of which may well be true, even allege that some of the Gospels were written
under the influence of such people. Finally, as Keller knows, in I Corinthians
15 (written in the early 50's), we have testimony to the resurrection of Jesus
that is no more than twenty to twenty-five years from the events themselves;
and in this chapter (see 15:3) Paul stresses that he is relying on traditions that
are much older than that. For various reasons, many scholars feel that Paul may
well be relying here on traditions that date from a year or two of the events!
(2) Like German New Testament scholar Willi Marxsen (on whom he relies
heavily), Keller stresses the point that there were no eyewitnesses to the resurrection event itself, and that the faith of the earliest believers in the resurrection
of Jesus was an inference. Keller says: "To say that Jesus was resurrected is to
express the conclusion of an inference, either based solely on the claims that
certain people saw the Risen Lord or based on these claims and also on the story
of the empty tomb" (p. 46).
Now the claim that belief in the resurrection is based on an inference, even
for those who saw the risen lord, is obviously true. I am not sure how helpful
to Keller the point is, however, for surely there are inferences involved in most
of our beliefs, and that fact does not make them suspect. It is true (so far as I
know) that no one was in the tomb with Jesus and saw the event itself. But
circumstantial evidence can be strong. If some time later today I were to see
and converse with my own father (who died after an automobile accident many
years ago, and whose body I saw in the casket), I would be (or at least could
be, depending on other circumstances) well within my intellectual rights in
inferring that a resurrection had occurred. Similarly, the earliest Christians
believed they saw and spoke with Jesus. Thus it is misleading when Keller says,
"The early Christians spoke of Jesus' resurrection not because they had seen it
occur, but because of other experiences which certain Christians had had (being
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appeared to by Jesus and possibly seeing his empty tomb)" (p. 46). I agree that
nobody saw the event itself occur, but some such "early Christians"-e.g., Mary
Magdalene, Peter, Thomas-saw the risen lord. That is why they said, "He is
risen." They did not have to rely on the experiences of certain other Christians. JO
(3) Keller argues that we today cannot recover what was meant by the term
"resurrection" as used by the earliest Christians. Did they think the tomb was
empty? Did they think that Jesus' resurrection body was a physical object? We
do not know, Keller says (see pp. 47, 50, 57-58, fn. 14). But this conclusion
is too skeptical. There are two questions here. First, is a concept of bodily
resurrection (where what was raised was a body that had spatial location, reflected
light, and could be seen and touched) taught in the New Testament accounts?
And here the answer is obviously yes. Despite some puzzling descriptions, II the
accounts stress heavily the physical nature of Jesus' resurrection body. We are
told several times, in unmistakeable terms, that Jesus walked and ate, and that
his body could be seen and felt. 12
Second, is the concept of bodily resurrection primitive, i.e., was it held by
the earliest believers? Again I think the answer is yes, though it is true that some
biblical scholars would demur. They hold that the earliest views of resurrection
were spiritual in nature (a view they claim is confirmed by Paul in I Corinthians
15:50) and that the later accounts grew more physical, primarily in response to
apologetic pressures. But I find these views unconvincing; let me mention two
important considerations.
(a) Paul claims in I Corinthians 15:6 that the resurrected Jesus "appeared to
more than five hundred brethren at one time, most of whom are still alive, though
some have fallen asleep." Since the very idea of a group hallucination or vision
is at best deeply problematical,13 Paul seems to be presupposing here some sort
of physical presence of Jesus. He is also in effect appealing to eyewitnesses. "If
you don't believe me you can check with them"-so he appears to be saying.
Keller claims we know too little about this appearance to draw any inferences
from it, and it is true that we know little about it (unless Paul speaks here of
the same appearance that is described more fully in Matthew 28:16-20). Keller
explains the appearance Paul cites by suggesting that since "by then" the story
of the appearance to Peter was well known, eventually many other people gradually joined in the claim to have seen Jesus, "not wanting to seem to lack faith
or insight" (pp. 57-58, fn. 14). But it is clear that this is a mere conjecture on
Keller's part, and an implausible one at that. There is no evidence to support it.
(b) Bodily resurrection was the understanding of resurrection commonly held
by Jews of Jesus' day. Of course other survival-of-death theories were then
current (e.g., Greek immortality doctrines), but apart from further elaboration
or explanation, any first century Jew would understand the term "resurrection"
to mean bodily resurrection (which would imply the empty tomb). Keller disputes
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this claim (p. 50); we simply cannot know, he says, what the earliest believers
in the resurrection held. But I think it important that nowhere in the New
Testament (not even in I Corinthians 15) or in any of its literary ancestors
hypothesized by scholars do we find firm evidence of the frequently-made modem
claim that Jesus was raised in only a non-bodily or purely spiritual sense.

III
Let me now reply to two philosophical criticisms that Keller makes. (1) In
my original article I made a distinction between what I called soft miracles and
hard miracles. A soft miracle, I said, was one that a naturalist could consistently
agree had actually occurred (e.g., some desperately ill person Jones suddenly
and inexplicably getting well); the naturalist will simply claim that it was not
due to any activity of God. A hard miracle, I said, is one which is so difficult
to explain naturalistically (e.g., a person dead for three days living again), that
consistent naturalists will want to deny that it has actually occurred. Keller
criticizes the distinction. He says: "But if one does not have a good reason to
think that a naturalistic explanation could not be given (as one typically does
not, in regard to soft miracles), why should one resort to a nonnaturalistic
explanation? ... The very fact that an unbeliever could accept the fact that
Jones had recovered while not accepting the resurrection would suggest that
Jones' recovery is no strong indication that a miraculous event has occurred"
(pp. 42-43).
Of course I agree that naturalistic explanations of phenomena ought to be
preferred by rational people. Nevertheless, Keller's approach to my distinction
is wrong. I meant it, so to speak, as a psychological (or perhaps epistemological)
distinction rather than an ontological one. Both soft miracles and hard miracles
are miracles, i.e., acts of God that involve interventions in the natural order. A
soft miracle is a highly improbable event which I cannot explain, nor can the
experts (the doctors, in my above example); but I can at least imagine a possible
naturalistic explanation, or can rationally imagine that there is one. If a soft
miracle is actually a miracle, however, the true explanation of the event is that
it was caused by God (as with a hard miracle). A hard miracle, on the other
hand, is an event that is so highly improbable that I cannot even imagine a
plausible naturalistic explanation.
When Keller alleges that with soft miracles one typically has a good reason
to think that a naturalistic explanation can be given, he is right. But this is not
always true. The question whether the event ought rationally to be called a
miracle depends on whether the available naturalistic explanations are plausible.
The reason to suspect that a soft miracle is a miracle is precisely the fact that
everyone (including the experts) is puzzled as to what has occurred and the
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available naturalistic explanations look unconvincing or even foolish. So, contrary
to what Keller says, a soft miracle (e.g., someone's suddenly recovering from
what looked like a hopeless case of cancer) might constitute rational grounds
for belief in a miracle. The naturalists might be wrong. Thus, I believe the
distinction between hard and soft miracles is still an acceptable distinction.
(2) As noted earlier, Keller argues that the thesis of my original paper holds
only if we observe an established pattern of miraculous divine activity in the
world; we in fact observe no such thing, so my thesis fails. Even if the biblical
evidence were much stronger than it is, he says, we need "evidence that God
has in the past acted in nonnatural events for similar ends" (p. 51, italics
Keller's). Now there is a point in the neighborhood here that is surely correct.
Attributing an apparently nonnatural event to the activity of God is probably
only rational for people who rationally believe (1) that God exists; (2) that God
occasionally acts miraculously in the world; and (3) that God acts miraculously
in the world on occasions like the one in question. Such a belief does seem
necessary not perhaps to rational belief that a nonnatural event has occurred but
to rational belief that it was caused by God. That much is clear.
But the problem is that Keller pushes this acceptable point to the absurd
extreme of claiming that belief in a given divinely-caused miracle is rational
only if we already possess proof that God has acted similarly in the past. 14 He
insists that these prior nonnatural events that form the believed-in pattern of
divine activity must be proven miracles or "clear" miracles. In order to assess
the rationality of belief in one purported miracle, he says, we have to assess the
rationality of belief in the purported miracles that are said to form its pattern.
Keller says: "If no clearly nonnatural events can be cited in biblical events or
in our own lives, how can it be rational to believe that they actually occur?" (p.
54, italics Keller's; see also pp. 53,54,60, fn. 31).
This requirement is absurd because it rules out rational belief in miracles a
priori (something Keller says he does not want to do). I can only rationally
believe in miracle MI if Ml fits a pattern of clear or proven miracles M2 and
M3; but I can only rationally believe in miracles M2 and M3 if they fit a pattern
of clear or proven miracles M4-M7; and etc. We are in a kind of vicious infinite
regress in which rational belief in a miracle can never (for logical reasons) get
started. I believe this is enough to show that Keller's requirements are far too
stringent. For me rationally to believe that a given purported nonnatural event
was caused by God, what is needed, I claim, is that I rationally believe that God
has acted nonnaturally and similarly in the past; the rationality of this belief
certainly could be established (in part) via proof of past miracles, but need not
be established in this way, and need not be established (at least not to the
satisfaction of those who do not share the belief) at all. Then, if I have the
relevant rational belief, and if the purported nonnatural event does occur, it can
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be rational for me to attribute it to God.
Keller makes much of the fact that there are no clear hard miracles occurring
today (pp. 53, 60). And if "clear" means "obvious to everyone (even naturalists),"
I agree. John Hick has taught us that all events are religiously ambiguous in the
sense that they can be interpreted either religiously or irreligiously. IS The most
natural and common event (e.g., the sun rising in the morning) can be treated
by the religious person as evidence of God's presence, and the most startling of
religious events (e.g., the Exodus) can be dismissed or interpreted innocuously
by skeptics. So perhaps there can be no such miracle (a clear hard miracle) as
Keller asks for. In my own view, there are events both in biblical and in recent
times whose best explanation is that they are miraculous acts of God. 16
IV

Keller nowhere explains his own view of the resurrection of Jesus. This is
understandable; his paper is a critique of my theory rather than a defense of his
own. Nevertheless, the reader finishes Keller's paper wondering what Keller
thinks actually happened in the days and weeks after the crucifixion. Perhaps
Keller would simply say, "I don't know." That surely is his right; as I said in
my original paper, since the idea that a man dead for three days would live again
is so improbable, agnosticism about the resurrection of Jesus can constitute a
rational position.
But Keller wants to deny my claim that belief in the resurrection of Jesus (in
the sense Keller defines for me) can also be a rational position. And here I think
Keller has simply not paid sufficient attention to the powerful arguments defenders
of the resurrection can marshal. These arguments ought not be expected to
convince naturalists, but for supernaturalists (especially those with broadly Christian assumptions) they are, I believe, more than sufficient to render belief in the
resurrection rational.
First, virtually all scholars who write about the resurrection of Jesus, whether
they believe it happened (in some sense or other) or not, agree that: (1) while
early first century Jews expected a messiah, the idea of a dying and rising messiah
was new; (2) Jesus of Nazareth died and was buried; (3) the disciples of Jesus
were consequently discouraged and dejected; (4) soon after the burial of Jesus,
his tomb was claimed to be empty and some of the disciples had experiences
that they took to be encounters with the risen Jesus; (5) these experiences caused
them to believe that Jesus had been raised from the dead; and (6) they started a
movement that grew and thrived and that was based on the idea that Jesus had
been raised from the dead. My point here is that there exists an acute embarrassment to those who deny that Jesus was raised from the dead or offer reductive
theories of the resurrection, viz., that they are unable to account for these widely
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accepted facts. That is, though many have tried, no nonbeliever in the resurrection
has been able to tell a convincing story of what occurred in the days following
the crucifixion. The nineteenth century rationalistic explanations of people like
Reimarus, Paulus, and Strauss collapse of their own weight once spelled out,
and skeptical twentieth century accounts are all subject to compelling criticismeither accounts of critics like Hugh Schonfield '7 or of believers who propose
reductive theories of Jesus' resurrection like Willi Marxsen. The only theories
that seem able to account for the accepted facts are those that affirm that Jesus
was genuinely raised.
Second, despite the frequently noted discrepancies in the New Testament
accounts of the resurrection of Jesus, at important points the biblical texts speak
with one voice. All of them affirm that Jesus was dead; that he was buried in a
tomb near Jerusalem supplied by a man named Joseph of Arimathea; that early
on the day after the Sabbath certain women in the company of Jesus (among
them Mary Magdalene) went to the tomb; that they found the tomb mysteriously
empty; they they met an angel or angels; that the women were either told or else
discovered that Jesus had been raised from the dead; and that Jesus subsequently
appeared a number of times to certain of the women and certain of the disciples.
There seem to be no resurrection texts that question any of these items. Furthermore, even the discrepancies themselves testify in a left-handed way to the
accuracy of the essential story. If the resurrection of Jesus were a story invented
by the later Christian church, or by certain members of it, no discrepancies
would have been allowed. The biblical accounts do not bear the earmarks of a lie.
Third, the deliberate lie thesis does not square with the radical change that
came over the disciples in the days and weeks after the crucifixion. Confused,
fearful, discouraged, and disorganized immediately afterward, they soon became
bold and courageous revolutionaries who started a religious movement that
changed the world order. Their unanimous testimony was that this change was
due to their belief in the resurrection of Jesus. Their behavior was not consistent
with the behavior of people who have intentionally perpetrated a fraud. Furthermore, the thesis that a few of the earliest believers perpetrated a fraud on the
rest of them is implausible because there is not one bit of evidence to support
it. No such secret ever "leaked out," nor is there any evidence of an inner circle
controversy among the early Christians on the truth of the resurrection. In fact,
the New Testament accounts of the resurrection of Jesus were written during a
time when eyewitnesses to the events described were still alive and could easily
refute erroneous claims. The evidence decisively supports the conclusion that
all the earliest Christians believed wholeheartedly in the resurrection of Jesus, 18
even at the cost (for many of them) of their lives.
Fourth, the story of the empty tomb has about it the ring of truth. I cannot
explore all the arguments here;IQ let me briefly mention five of them. (1) The
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empty tomb is widely taught in the New Testament-in all three synoptic Gospels
(note especially that it appears in Matthew's special source, i.e., in material
Matthew did not get from Mark or Q), in the Fourth Gospel, and is possibly
alluded to in both Paul (I Corinthians 15:4)20 and in Acts (see Acts 2:27-29).21
(2) No story invented by later Christians to bolster their claims about Jesus'
resurrection would have revolved so crucially around the testimony of women,
whose value as legal witness in the culture of the day was virtually negligible. 22
(3) Most conclusively, it is impossible to imagine the earliest believers having
any success whatsoever in their attempt to convince people that Jesus had been
raised from the dead without ungainsayable evidence of an empty tomb. Otherwise, their enemies could have refuted their testimony by simply producing the
body. Keller replies to this argument by casting doubt on the early chapters of
the book of Acts (see pp. 49-50); but it should be noted that many able New
Testament scholars find the chronology ofthose chapters reliable. 23 (4) Contrary
to what Keller says, the earliest believers in the resurrection must have believed
in an empty tomb, for as noted above that is how any Jew in early first century
Palestine would have interpreted the idea of resurrection. Jewish notions of
resurrection were highly physical notions, quite unlike Greek immortality concepts or the later idea of "spiritual resurrection. "24 (5) The story of the guard at
the tomb in Matthew's gospel is often attacked by critics as an apologetic legend
told by the later church. It is easy to see, however, that even if this is true (and
I do not accept that it is), the telling of the story is senseless unless everyoneChristian and nonchristian alike-agreed that the tomb was empty.
Fifth, for several obvious reasons the resurrection appearances of Jesus do not
seem to be hallucinations. The disciples were not expecting a resurrection. On
at least three occasions the resurrected Jesus was not immediately recognized.
Many different people saw the risen Jesus, in different places and in different
circumstances. There were none of the usual causes of hallucination presentdrugs, hysteria, or deprivation of food, water, or sleep.25 It looks as if the
appearances of Jesus caused the Easter faith of the disciples rather than (as is
sometimes charged) the other way around.
If 1 were a supernaturalist who discovered these items of evidence about the
claim that Jesus was raised from the dead, 1 would be rational in believing that
claim. Thus, unless these arguments are defective, Keller has not refuted the
point that 1 tried to make in my original paper, viz., that belief in the resurrection
of Jesus is rational. 1 agree with Keller (see pp. 50, 54) that in some sense the
burden of proof ought to be on those who argue that a miracle has occurred.
But the evidence in favor of the claim that Jesus was genuinely dead and later
genuinely alive is sufficient to render the resurrection belief of Christians rational.
This is especially true since those who deny that there was a genuine resurrection
seem quite unable to explain what did in fact happen in the days after the
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crucifixion. Further, they seem equally unable to explain why an obscure itinerant
rabbi who died a criminal's death became so quickly (in the eyes of many) the
Christ, the savior of the world, the Son of God.
Keller closes his article with a kind of appeal on behalf of people who are
Christians but who doubt that the resurrection of Jesus (in the sense I have been
working with) happened. I accept that appeal. Of course there are Christians of
such a persuasion. Of course they are making "an honest effort to come to terms
with the Christian scriptures in light of alI we can learn" (p. 55). I believe I
know some such folk; some of them are friends and colleagues of mine. I have
no desire to deny they are Christians, convict them of heresy, accuse them of
"bad faith," deny them tenure, or anything of the sort. I do want to reserve the
right to disagree with them. This is because I believe a notion of resurrection
like the one I have been defending is the most faithful and defensible one for
Christians of today.

Claremont McKenna College
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